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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SCHOOL DESEGREGATION - INTERDISTRICT
DESEGREGATION ORDER IS WITHIN DISCRETION OF DISTRICT COURT
WHEN BASED UPON FINDING OF ONE OR MORE INTERDISTRICT
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.
Evans v. Buchanan (1977).
Plaintiffs, representing black school children of Wilmington, Delaware,'
brought suit 2 against the State Board of Education (State Board) and the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, alleging that black children in
Wilmington were being forced to attend segregated schools. 3 Plaintiffs
contended that defendants had violated prior federal court orders to
dismantle their dual school system4 and had impermissibly infringed upon
the rights of the plaintiff class under the equal protection clause of the
1. Because of the length of the litigation involved, there arose some question as
to whether the named plaintiffs continued to fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class. Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 337-38 (D. Del. 1976).
Although the action had not been certified as a proper class action prior to 1976, the
case had been so treated. Id. at 337 n.19. Finding sufficient representation by the
named class members who continued to have standing by virtue of the present
attendance of some of their children in the schools, the district court held that the
action could proceed as a certified class action, subject to the requirement that any
"representation 'gaps"' arising at a later date be filled by the addition of new parties.
Id. at 338.
2. Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del. 1974) and 393 F. Supp. 428 (D.
Del. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975), further proceedings, 416 F. Supp. 328
(D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 235-36 (1977). See
also Appendix.
3. 379 F. Supp. at 1219. It is important in following the passage of the case
through the courts to note at the outset that the district court determined before any
proceedings had begun that the case would be bifurcated. Id. at 1220, n.1. The initial
phase would be to determine if there had been any constitutional violations. Id. If
such findings were made, then consideration of the possible remedies would be treated
in a second separate portion of the action. Id.
4. Id. at 1219-20. Until 1954, Delaware was required to maintain a dual school
system. See DEL. CONST. art. X, § 2; DEL. CODE tit. 14, § 141 (1953). In 1952, the
Supreme Court of Delaware refused to hold that segregation in the public schools was
per se illegal. Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. 144, 91 A.2d 137 (1952). Gebhart was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court as a companion case to Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). Gebhart was again consolidated with Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), and was remanded to the Supreme Court of
Delaware for further proceedings to require "a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance" with Brown I, and "to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system." Id. at 300-01. Subsequently, there have been
fifteen reported decisions spanning two decades in the Delaware federal district court
and the Third Circuit alone relating to this order. For a list of these decisions, see
Appendix. The list will undoubtedly continue to grow. See "Widespread busing plan
detailed for Wilmington, suburban pupils," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 10, 1978,
at 1-A, Col. 1 (reporting predicted appeals of the actual desegregation plan announced
by the district court).
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fourteenth amendment.5 These allegations were based upon three broad
grounds.6 First, according to the plaintiffs, the state continued to maintain a
dual school system in New Castle County,7 within which the City of
Wilmington is located.8 Second, plaintiffs asserted that the exclusion of
Wilmington from the Educational Advancement Act of 1968 (1968 Act)9
operated to support the continuation of primarily black school districts. 0
Finally, plaintiffs contended that various state actions of an ongoing nature
resulted in continued segregation in Delaware schools despite the declared
duty of the state to desegregate."
After making detailed statistical findings, the district court found that
segregation of the Wilmington schools had not been eradicated. 12 In a later
opinion 3 based upon further findings, 4 the court held that violations
having interdistrict effects had been sufficiently established to allow
5. 379 F. Supp. at 1219-20. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent
part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. 379 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
7. Id. New Castle County, the most populous of Delaware's three counties,
occupies 435 square miles in area and has a population, according to the 1970 census,
of approximately 386,000. 393 F. Supp. at 432. The City of Wilmington occupies
approximately 15 square miles and is located roughly at the center of that portion of
New Castle County which lies north of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. Id. In
1970, Wilmington's population was approximately 80,000. Id.
8. Id. See note 7 supra.
9. Educational Advancement Act of 1968, DEL. CODE tit. 14, §§ 1001-1094 (1974).
The purpose of the 1968 Act was "to provide the framework for an effective and
orderly reorganization of the existing school districts" of the State of Delaware. Id.
§ 1001. For a limited time, the 1968 Act allowed the State Board of Education to
consolidate school districts in accordance with the dictates of sound educational
administration and certain criteria. Id. §§ 1002-1003. The Wilmington School District
was expressly excluded from the reorganization powers of the State Board. Id.
§ 1004(c)(4). In addition, Wilmington was excluded by implication from any
consolidation plan by § 1004(c)(2), which limited the maximum pupil enrollment in
any proposed school district to 12,000. See 393 F. Supp. at 438-39.
10. 379 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
11. 379 F. Supp. at 1220. See note 15 infra.
12. 379 F. Supp. at 1223. The basis of this finding was the presence of racially
identifiable schools in a formerly de jure segregated system. Id. The district court
concluded that a unitary school system had never been established. Id. Therefore, the
court found it unnecessary in this opinion to consider possible violations of equal
protection through the challenged provisions of the 1968 Act or possible violations
through the enforcement and approval of racial discrimination by the state in its
laws, customs, usages, and policies. Id. at 1224. See text accompanying notes 6-11
8upra. In addition, the court noted that determination of the sufficiency of a
Wilmington-only plan in remedying the violation would have to await the second
phase of the proceedings. 379 F. Supp. at 1224. Therefore, the court required the
submission of both intra- and interdistrict desegregation plans for consideration. Id.
13. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975).
14. Id. at 432-46. These further findings were necessary for the court to consider
the criteria for interdistrict relief developed in the intervening decision of the United
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consideration of both inter- and intradistrict remedies.' 5 This holding was
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.
16
The district court, having concluded the liability aspect of the bifurcated
proceedings, 17 advanced to the consideration of the appropriate remedy to be
imposed.1 8 After considering a variety of proposed plans, 9 the court rejected
an intradistrict plan as ineffective,2° and ordered that the eleven districts
comprising northern New Castle County be reorganized together with the
Wilmington School District into a single desegregation area.
21
15. 393 F. Supp. at 446-47. The court expressly stated that any consideration as
to the scope of the remedy for the violations would be deferred for later determination.
Id. at 446. Specifically, the district court found violations of eight general types. Id. at
433-46. The court ruled that the passage of the 1968 Act was a violation of the equal
protection clause and stated that it "contributed to the separation of the races by...
redrawing school district lines." Id. at 438-46. In addition, the court identified seven
other groupings of violative actions on the part of the state. Id. at 433-38. These
included: 1) the location of public housing projects; 2) state subsidies for the
interdistrict transportation of students enrolled in private schools; 3) the allowing of
optional attendance zones in the Wilmington School District; 4) the recordation in
New Castle County of real estate deeds containing racially restrictive covenants; 5)
state-mandated ethical rules for realtors that reinforced racial discrimination in
housing; 6) prior racially determined interdistrict pupil assignments; and 7) the
Federal Housing Administration's mortgage underwriting manual, advocating the
maintenance of racially homogeneous neighborhoods through lending practices. Id.
The court completed the liability phase of the case by declaring unconstitutional the
provisions of the 1968 Act that excluded Wilmington from consideration for
consolidation, and by ordering the submission of remedial plans of both intra- and
interdistrict characters for consideration by the court in the remedy phase of the case.
Id. at 447.
16. 423 U.S. 963 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 1080 (1976).
17. See note 3 supra.
18. Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976).
19. Id. at 336-37. The plans submitted were of three basic types: 1) voluntary
plans, including free transfer provisions and magnet schools; 2) plans for reorganiz-
ing the existing school districts and allowing the new school boards to make
assignments of the students, including blacks, within the division; and 3) mandatory
assignment plans requiring busing of students among the existing districts for
predetermined periods of exposure to the integration experience. Id.
20. Id. at 341-44. The court noted that there was a 90% minority enrollment in the
Wilmington system and that a Wilmington-only plan would not significantly alter the
racial patterns found to exist in the schools of Wilmington and its suburbs. Id. at
342-44. The court carefully clarified its holding as not based upon "the fact that
Wilmington would be a black system surrounded by white systems," or upon a
determination that "a majority black system is of necessity segregated." Id. at 344.
Instead, the court reasoned that "[w]here the plan would result in the maintenance of
the traditional racial identity previously established by State action, and that
disparity in racial enrollments remains substantial, it cannot be said that it results in
the disestablishment of a dual system." Id. Therefore, the court held that on the basis
of the evidence presented, a Wilmington-only plan would not be a sufficient remedy
and an interdistrict remedy would have to be considered. Id.
21. Id. at 353-55. This area was to be operated as a single system subject to the
right of the State Board to propose smaller districts for the area if it could be shown
that they did not impede actual desegregation. Id. at 351, 352-58.
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On appeal,22 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 23
affirmed, holding that based upon the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
prior findings of interdistrict violations,24 the interdistrict remedy proposed
was not beyond established legal parameters and did not constitute an
abuse of the district court's discretion. Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 235-36 (1977).
The fountainhead from which all school desegregation cases have
sprung is Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1).25 In Brown I, the United
States Supreme Court struck the "separate but equal" doctrine26 from the
field of public education.2 7 The Brown I Court held that the maintenance of
racially segregated schools violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 28 Cases subsequent to Brown I emphasized that
purposeful racial discrimination accomplished by a state or its officials, or
by a school board or school officials, or by others acting under color of law,
29
is a prerequisite to a finding that a school system is segregated in violation
22. Defendants' direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the order entered pursuant
to the district court opinion was denied on jurisdictional grounds. 429 U.S. 973 (1976).
This denial prompted appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. The case was heard by the court en banc. Judge Aldisert wrote the majority
opinion in which Judges Van Dusen, Adams and Weis joined. Judge Garth filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Judges Rosenn and Hunter joined.
24. 423 U.S. 963 (1975). See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text infra.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
26. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Supreme Court stated that "the
object of the [14th] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of
the two races before the law," however, "[laws permitting, and even requiring, their
separation . . . have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the
competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power." Id. at 544.
27. 347 U.S. at 493-95. See generally Wise, Desegregation in Education: A Legal
Bibliography, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 733 (1977).
28. 347 U.S. at 493-95. For the pertinent text of the fourteenth amendment, see
note 5 supra.
29. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7 (1966); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). The equal protection clause prohibits only improper state action.
See note 5 supra. The action may be executive, legislative, or judicial. Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879). The fact that the violator is a political
subdivision or other entity to which the state has delegated some of its functions has
not presented obstacles to the finding of state action, although some barriers have
been met in the implementation of appropriate remedies. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974). But see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
1977-1978]
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of the Constitution.3° In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II),31 the
Supreme Court stated that remedies for proven constitutional violations are
equitable in nature 2 and expressly designated the "revision of school
districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admissions to the public schools on a non-racial basis" as an
appropriate remedial effort.
33
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,3 the Supreme
Court addressed the scope of the duty of school authorities and district
courts in implementing Brown I and II and announced that the goal of a
desegregation remedy was "to correct, by a balancing of the individual and
collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution. 3 5 General
remedial principles, according to the Court, required that judicial power
extend "only on the basis of a constitutional violation.136 Although it
realized that "as with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines
the scope of the remedy, '37 the Court emphasized that the remedial process
of desegregation must "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation.
'38
30. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the equal protection clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(official action is not unconstitutional merely because of disproportionate impact;
intent to accomplish such impact must be shown); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973).
The Court in Keyes defined the proscribed de jure segregation as actions with
the intent to segregate. Id. at 208. Such purposeful segregation is to be distinguished
from de facto segregation which is unintentionally discriminatory in effect. Id. See
generally Note, "Intention" as a Requirement for De Jure School Segregation, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (1976); Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative
Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976). See also
Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972).
31. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
32. The Brown II Court noted that "[iun fashioning and effectuating the decrees,
the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 300-01.
34. 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (remedy for segregation within a single school district).
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 26. Applying this formula for determining the details of the plan to be
implemented in eradicating past discrimination, the Supreme Court affirmed the
remedy ordered by the district court. Id. at 32. This plan included the use of ratios of
majority to minority students or faculty, alteration of attendance zones, and busing of
students. Id. at 22-30. See also Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
The Court in Davis stated that "[h]aving once found a violation, the district judge or
school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." Id. at 37.
Thus, in Davis, it was found to be error to consider the eastern part of the county as an
isolated area, where such isolation would leave those schools 90% black, despite the
fact that the county was divided by a major north-south highway. Id. at 37-38. See
also Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government
Responsibility, 39 U. CH. L. REv. 421 (1972); Note, Schools, Busing and Desegrega-
tion: The Post-Swann Era, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1078 (1971).
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In 1974, the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley39 applied the
guidelines of Brown I and II and Swann in defining the situations in which
the reorganization of school districts or other forms of interdistrict relief
would be justified. 40 In Milliken, the lower court had ordered an interdistrict
remedy where constitutional violations were found to exist in only one of the
fifty-four school districts involved in the metropolitan area desegregation
plan.41 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this attempt to disregard
permissibly drawn school district lines.42 In establishing the standards for
the granting of an interdistrict remedy, the Milliken Court analyzed both the
purpose of a remedy and the means of achieving the purpose. The purpose of
the remedy, according to the Court, must be "to restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct, ' 43 while the means of accomplishing the purpose
must be consistent with the "principle ... that the scope of the remedy is
determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation." 44 Based
upon this analysis, the Court described the circumstances that would
warrant the imposition of interdistrict relief: 1) where a violation in one
district has produced a "significant segregative effect" in another district; 2)
39. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
40. Id. at 737-41, 744-45. Prior to Milliken, the Supreme Court had established
the principle that the discriminatory use of boundaries themselves could support an
order of interdistrict relief; school district lines that had been drawn or changed to
effectuate impermissible segregation could be ignored. Wright v. Council of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
See also Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1050-51 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). This, however, is to be distinguished from the
question in Milliken whether boundary lines, which were not established for
discriminatory purposes, may be transgressed to remedy other constitutional
violations.
41. 418 U.S. at 735-36.
42. Id. at 741-44. The Court stated that "(b]oundary lines may be bridged where
there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion
that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country." Id. at 741.
Recently, the Supreme Court indicated, in a case involving the discriminatory
placement of public housing by the Chicago Housing Authority, that an interdistrict
housing remedy will be permitted even without satisfaction of the preconditions to
such relief established by Milliken when such an order will not restructure or
consolidate local governmental entities. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293, 305-06
(1976). This decision will have little effect on school desegregation cases, however,
where an interdistrict consolidation order will by definition work some restructuring
of the local control of school districts which the Court has recognized as "separate
independent governmental entities responsible for the operation of autonomous public
school systems." Id. at 295-96. For an excellent examination of the possibilities of
using the broad Hills housing remedies as a long-range school integration tool, see
Kanner, Interdistrict Remedies for School Segregation After Milliken v. Bradley and
Hills v. Gautreaux, 48 Miss. L.J. 33 (1977).
43. 418 U.S. at 746. The Court stated that "[d]isparate treatment of white and
Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system and not elsewhere, and on
this record the remedy must be limited to that system." Id.
44. Id. at 744.
1977-1978]
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where two or more districts have each committed violations; or 3) where
district lines have been influenced by purposeful adaptation to perpetuate
segregation.
45
Despite the delineation in Milliken of the prerequisites to the imposition
of an interdistrict remedy, considerable Supreme Court activity continued in
the school desegregation area. 46 However, the Supreme Court had never
45. Id. at 744-45. The Milliken Court stated:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a
cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional
violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in
another district. Specifically it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts
of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might
be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts
caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have
been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an
interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segrega-
tion directly caused by the constitutional violation.
Id. However, the Court added: "Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and an
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict
remedy." Id. at 745 (emphasis added). The Court's expression of the various
circumstances in which interdistrict relief would be appropriate is, thus, not entirely
clear. This language could be read to imply that multidistrict relief necessitates
finding a violation on the part of each district to be included. See Freilich, Down with
the Doughnut - Up with the Whole: The Need for Metropolitan Relief in School and
Housing Integration, 7 URB. LAw. xi, xiv (1975); Wolf, Social Science Data and the
Courts: The Detroit Schools Case, 42 PUB. INT. 102 (1976). Later commentaries have
recognized that Milliken will permit interdistrict relief in districts where, although no
violation has been committed, significant segregative effects can be found that were
caused by violations that occurred elsewhere. See Kanner, supra note 42, at 36-37.
46. This activism can be seen in an examination of the cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court for the 1976-77 term involving school desegregation issues.
Of thirteen cases, certiorari was denied in six. However, none of these six
cases involved findings of extensive constitutional violations. Only one involved an
order of a desegregation remedy. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County v. Newburg Area
Council, Inc., 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). Two cases dealt with very narrow issues regarding
remedial plans. McDonough v. Morgan, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (appointment of a
temporary receiver to implement the school district desegregation plan); Cuthbertson
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. 831 (1976) (dismissal of a challenge to
the propriety of racially based pupil assignments as part of a desegregation remedy).
Two other cases denied review of procedural issues. St. Louis Bd. of Educ. v. Caldwell,
433 U.S. 914 (1977) (proper intervening parties); Young v. Midland Ind. School Dist.,
430 U.S. 983 (1977) (propriety of mandamus). The final case in which certiorari was
denied concerned a finding of no constitutional violation. Board of Educ. of Ind.
School Dist. No. 53 v. Board of Educ. of Ind. School Dist. No. 52, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
In the remaining seven of the thirteen desegregation related cases, certiorari
was granted in six. Only one case resulted in affirmance, and the issue presented was
limited to upholding compensatory educational programs as a proper desegregation
remedy. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The remaining five cases, each
involving findings of constitutional violations or extensive remedies, were vacated
and remanded for further findings. Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); School
Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977); Dayton School Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Buckley,
429 U.S. 1068 (1977); Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
The final case of the thirteen was the appeal in the instant case which was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. Delaware St. Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 429 U.S. 973 (1976).
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accepted, either by affirming or refusing review, a lower court order
consolidating city school systems of high minority-group enrollments with
surrounding, predominantly white, suburban districts.47 Thus, although
interdistrict remedial measures would be a highly effective tool in
desegregating racially concentrated metropolitan areas, a lower court order
that imposed such a comprehensive interdistrict desegregation remedy can
not be considered to have come clearly before the Court and settled by a
simple denial of review.
In the instant case, the Third Circuit explicitly noted that the district
court had applied the Milliken standards in determining that interdistrict
segregation was present. 48 Observing that the affirmance by the Supreme
Court of the district court's prior order would bind later determinations by
the concept of the law of the case,49 the court first analyzed what the
summary affirmance of the prior order determined.50 Although conceding
that "it is not always crystal clear what exactly was adjudicated by the
Supreme Court" in a summary affirmance,5' the court held that one or more
interdistrict violations had been concluded in the prior proceedings and were
binding upon it in evaluating the validity of the ordered remedy.5 2
Proceeding to the consideration of the remedy ordered by the district
court, the majority emphasized that as a reviewing court, it was "not
47. But cf. Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977) (denial of review of comprehensive remedy not involving court
ordered consolidation of school districts); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975) (interdistrict consolidation not involving urban-
suburban desegregation).
48. 555 F.2d at 376.
49. Id. at 376-78. In general, the concept of the law of the case requires that
within one action, regarding issues of law previously determined in that action, a
determination once made will be treated as correct in all subsequent stages of the
proceeding, unless the question is reviewed by a higher court. Thus a question decided
in an interlocutory appeal will be treated as conclusively determined by the same
appellate court, as well as all lower courts for purposes of later review. See F. JAMES,
JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.5 (2d ed. 1977). See also Vestal, Law of
the Case: Single Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5-10 (1967).
50. Id. at 377. The court determined that the Supreme Court reviewed both the
findings of constitutional violations and the validity of the district court's order to
submit interdistrict plans based upon these violations. Id. The court also rejected a
contention that it was incumbent upon it to consider the continued legitimacy of
affirmed violations merely because of intervening expressions by the Supreme Court
that did not significantly alter the legal basis of the earlier determinations. Id. at
377-78, citing Insurance Group Comm. v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 329 U.S. 607
(1947).
51. 555 F.2d at 377.
52. Id. at 377-78. What the court believed to have been bindingly determined is
not immediately apparent. Although stating that "we conclude that the Supreme
Court affirmed the finding of one or more interdistrict constitutional violations," the
court further noted that "[i]f the defendants believe that some of the eight violations
were not affirmed, they should take, or perhaps previously should have taken,
appropriate steps to obtain review of this matter, or a clarification, by the Supreme
Court." Id. at 377. However, the court next reverted to the prior language regarding
what had been established as the law of the case, stating: "We hold, therefore, that
one or more interdistrict constitutional violations were found by the district court and
affirmed by the Supreme Court." Id. at 378.
1977-1978]
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empowered to consider the matter de novo," 53 because the "fashioning of a
remedy is committed 'to the exercise of the district judge's discretion.' '54
Stating that an improper use of discretion would be found only when the
court's action "is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper
standards, criteria or procedures are used,155 the court discussed whether the
district court's remedy constituted an abuse of discretion.5 6 After reviewing
the enunciated purpose of the remedial order,57 the court stated two legal
limitations upon the exercise of remedial power: first, the scope of the
remedy may only encompass the extent of the effects of the violation;58 and
second, no particular degree of racial balance may be mandated.5 9 Based
upon these limitations, the Third Circuit concluded that within the narrow
framework of permissible review, it could not determine that the result
ordered by the district court constituted a misuse of discretion.60 With minor
modification, 61 the remedy ordered by the district court mandating an
interdistrict desegregation area including most of northern New Castle
County was affirmed.
62
Judge Garth, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the majority
opinion was insufficient in two critical respects.6 3 First, it had failed to
enumerate the constitutional violations being remedied.6 4 Second, it
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id., quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1971).
55. 555 F.2d at 378-79, citing Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1976).
56. 555 F.2d at 379-80.
57. Id. This purpose was to eliminate unconstitutional racial discrimination "root
and branch." Id., quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). The
schools were to be returned to the approximate position they would have been in but
for the constitutional violations found. 555 F.2d at 380.
58. 555 F.2d at 379. The court stated that "[t]he existence of a constitutional
violation does not authorize a court to seek to bring about conditions that never would
have existed if there had been no constitutional violation." Id.
59. Id. at 379, citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 (1974), and Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
60. 555 F.2d at 380. See note 74 infra.
61. Id. The court expressly disapproved of any interpretation of the district court
opinion suggesting that any racial quotas would be required in an enrollment or
pupil assignment plan, specifically holding that "no particular racial balance will be
required in any school, grade, or classroom." Id. The court also added a requirement
that state authorities file with the district court a report describing their efforts to
accomplish desegregation within the remedial area. Id. at 381.
62. Id. at 382. For clarity, the court proceeded to draft the precise order to be
entered. Id. at 381-82. The remedy provided for the entire desegregation area to be
consolidated under one governing authority. Id. The order did not detail the actual
process by which desegregation was to be accomplished. Id. These minutiae of pupil
assignments, funding, and other specific procedural matters were left for further
resolution in the district court. Id. This plan has since been formalized and was made
public on January 9, 1978. See Philadelphia Inquirer, supra note 4. As reported at the
time, there is a substantial likelihood of further appeal concerning the propriety of the
process implementing the ordered remedy within the desegregation area. Id. at 2-A.
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contained no findings regarding the effects such violations had upon the
racial composition of the schools within the area designated for remedial
action.65 The dissent predicted that the result of this failure would be further,
time-consuming appeals.
66
Utilizing a limited interpretation of the jurisdictional basis of the prior
Supreme Court review,67 the dissent found that the summary affirmance
meant only that the enactment of the 1968 Act 68 constituted an interdistrict
violation.6 9 Subsequent to this determination, according to the dissent, the
Supreme Court "had no occasion to inquire into the validity of any of the
other seven interdistrict violations found by the district court." 70 Based upon
this reasoning the dissent determined that the other seven possible
violations should be remanded for consideration in light of the Supreme
Court cases decided subsequent to the decision of the district court.7 1 The
purpose of this remand, according to the dissent, would be to supplement the
evidence with findings as to the required racially discriminatory intent.
72
The dissent argued that only after determining precisely which of the
65. Id.
66. Id. The basis of this objection was the fear of subsequent piecemeal challenges
of each separate constitutional violation possibly affirmed by the Supreme Court. Id.
67. Id. at 386-89 (Garth, J., dissenting). In the appeal to the Supreme Court,
review was obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which allows appeals "from an
order granting or denying ... an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined
by a district court of three judges." 555 F.2d at 386-89 (Garth, J., dissenting). See 379
F. Supp. at 1220.
68. See note 9 supra.
69. 555 F.2d at 386-89 (Garth, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 389 (Garth, J., dissenting). The dissent conceded that since the lower
court order constituted a permanent rather than a preliminary injunction, the
Supreme Court did not approve merely the "raising of serious questions" as to the
constitutionality of the 1968 Act, but its unconstitutionality in fact. Id. at 387-88
(Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth, by limiting his interpretation of the scope of the
statutory review under § 1253, implicitly rejected the possibility that when an appeal
is authorized under § 1253, jurisdiction could extend to review of all of the issues of the
case. Cf. Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Judge Garth agreed with the majority that it was not the province of the court
to reexamine, on the basis of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the constitutional
violations that were affirmed. 555 F.2d at 388-89 (Garth, J., dissenting). However, the
dissent did not agree that the Supreme Court necessarily affirmed the interdistrict
character of permissible remedial plans. Id. at 389 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth
admitted that this disagreement would have no effect on the instant case since an
interdistrict remedy could have been considered solely on the basis of the 1968 Act
violation, which, he conceded, had been affirmed. Id.
71. 555 F.2d at 389 (Garth, J., dissenting). See Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (intent or purpose to racially discriminate required to find violation of equal
protection). The district court opinion in Evans, in which the interdistrict violations
were described, was written before Washington was decided. Judge Garth maintained
that "[n]ot only did the district court fail to find that these actions were motivated by
a racially discriminatory intent, but there is language in the court's opinion which
may imply that the court felt that the opposite was true." 555 F.2d at 389 (Garth, J.,
dissenting) citing 393 F. Supp. at 435.
72. 555 F.2d at 389 (Garth, J., dissenting).
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original violations were still legally sufficient could the district court
ascertain the direct segregative effects of those violations and design a plan
to eradicate them.
7 3
The principal criticism of the majority opinion, it is submitted, is its
paucity of explanatory analysis." Nevertheless, while it is submitted that
the questions raised by the dissent were not satisfactorily explained in the
majority opinion, it is suggested that close attention to the result of the
decision may resolve these objections.
It appears that the necessary implication of the Third Circuit's holding
- that the scope of the remedy should encompass an interdistrict
desegregation area - was consistent with the district court's exercise of
discretion. In light of the district court's finding that sufficient evidence was
shown of some segregative effects in the districts consolidated 75 and the
Third Circuit's finding of "one or more inter-district violations," 6 designa-
tion of an interdistrict desegregation area was supportable, 77 particularly
since the district court findings are accorded deference.7 8
In addition, it is suggested that the determination that the scope of the
remedy across school district boundaries was the only issue that could be
settled without remanding to the district court or venturing into uncertain
areas which could have led to reversal. 79 The dilemma facing the Third
73. Id. at 390 (Garth, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 383-86 (Garth, J., dissenting). The court merely enunciated the legal
principles involved, including the highly deferential standard of review to be applied,
and concluded: "Viewed in this context, we cannot say that the result ordered by the
district court was a misuse of discretion." Id. at 380.
75. 416 F. Supp. at 338-41, 353-55. The district court stated:
We need not catalogue the set of violations . . . set forth in the last opinion
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Nor need we rehearse the reasons why we held
the 1968 Act to be an unconstitutional "redrawing of district lines." It suffices to
say that the acts described in the prior opinions were the acts of the state and its
subdivisions, and had a substantial, not a de minimus, effect on the enrollment
patterns of the separate districts."
Id. at 339 (footnotes omitted).
76. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. The one violation conceded by even
the dissent to have been bindingly determined, the enactment of the 1968 Act, would
in itself seem to support the holding delineating the scope of the remedy as being
within the northern New Castle County area. See note 69 and accompanying text
supra.
77. See 416 F. Supp. at 338-41, for a review of the principles upon which such a
determination may permissibly be based. See notes 31-33, 36 & 45 and accompanying
text supra.
78. 555 F.2d at 378-80.
79. The principal of Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), is
instructive. In Dayton, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court a Sixth
Circuit decision that had been based upon violations not expressly found unconstitu-
tional as purposefully discriminatory. Id. at 421. Concededly, Dayton was handed
down by the Supreme Court after the decision of the Third Circuit in Evans, but it is
clear that a holding based upon alleged violations subsequently determined not to
have been affirmed by the Supreme Court would run the risk of reversal in light of the
requirement of a finding of purposeful discrimination emphasized by the Supreme
Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), both decided after the
affirmance of Evans. See note 30 supra.
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Circuit was that the Supreme Court, despite requests for clarification,8 and
the pointed objections of three Justices,81 twice refused to indicate the exact
import of its summary affirmance.82 The Third Circuit thus could not with
assurance base a holding upon the assumption that all eight violations were
affirmed, 3 nor upon the assumption that any violations were affirmed other
than that involving the 1968 Act, which even the Evans dissent conceded to
have been determined.84 It is submitted that this dilemma, combined with
the court's desire to reach a final disposition of the scope of the remedy to be
implemented, resulted in an extremely limited holding, which shunned the
details of the remedial plan in order to avoid the need to remand to the
district court.
In this light, the dissent's objection to the majority's failure to elucidate
the explicit constitutional violations that were still extant 85 could be viewed
as a disagreement of timing rather than of substance. The dissent's desire to
remand for further findings before determining the scope of the remedy
8 6
seems misplaced, because it appears that a remand is unnecessary to the
remedial scope determination. 7 Instead, it is submitted that the sufficiency
of the other violations can be appropriately considered at the time of the
formation of the actual desegregation plan. Thus, the majority's holding
seems to defer the resolution of the validity of the other- violations rather
than abdicate their consideration entirely.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the dissent's second objection, the lack
of findings on the actual effects of constitutional violations to be remedied,
88
could also be regarded as a matter of timing. It is submitted that these
findings were unnecessary to the limited holding of Evans regarding the
area included in the desegregation plan,89 and would be resolved more
appropriately when a specific remedial plan is accepted.90 Accordingly, the
80. 423 U.S. 1080 (1976) (request for rehearing of summary affirmance denied on
jurisdictional grounds).
81. 423 U.S. 963 (1975). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell, dissented from the summary affirmance on both substantive and
jurisprudential grounds. Id. at 964. Regarding the latter, Justice Rehnquist explained:
[T]his is one of those cases in which an opinion of the Court seems to me to be
necessary, not merely to resolve an issue concededly present, but to denominate
for the benefit of the parties and the District Court what issues the Court
conceives to be resolved by its summary affirmance. My dissent from that sort of
affirmance here is based on my conviction that it is extraordinarily slipshod
judicial procedure as well as my conviction that it is incorrect.
Id. at 975 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. See notes 80 & 81 supra.
83. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 52 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
86. 555 F.2d at 389-90 (Garth, J., dissenting).
87. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
88. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
89. The interdistrict remedy could be ordered on the basis of the 1968 Act
violation. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
90. But see 555 F.2d at 389-90 (Garth, J., dissenting) (dissent would require
remand as to causation of segregative effects remedied).
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fault with the majority opinion, it is suggested, lies not in the court's deferral
of these questions but in the failure expressly to acknowledge their
continued presence.
It is clear that the fate of New Castle County has been determined to
some degree. On the basis of at least one conclusively established violation,
the Third Circuit has at a minimum designated that it was within the proper
bounds of discretion for the district court to define the territorial scope of the
appropriate remedy as that of northern New Castle County. 91 It must be
noted, however, that the unexpressed limits of the majority's holding
regarding the seven questionable constitutional violations raises the strong
possibility that the parties and the district court will be unable to act with
any certainty on the basis of this decision. 92 In addition, if the plan of
desegregation ordered within the remedial area is not clearly traceable to
eradication of the precise effects of validly determined constitutional
violations, it seems apparent that appealable issues have not been
foreclosed. 93
Furthermore, the denial by the Supreme Court of petitions for writs of
certiorari94 would seem to reveal the Court's determination to apply the
Milliken standards 95 to comprehensive interdistrict remedies in urban-
suburban school desegregation cases. By refusing review, the Supreme Court
has apparently indicated that henceforth, when the focus has gone beyond
the validity of the constitutional violations underlying the ordered remedy,
the propriety of ordering a comprehensive interdistrict desegregation plan
which judicially consolidates urban and suburban school districts will not
be subject to Supreme Court review. 96
James D. Hilly
91. See text accompanying notes 52 & 60-62 supra.
92. See 555 F.2d at 383-85 (Garth, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 385-86 (Garth, J., dissenting).
94. 98 S. Ct. 235-36 (1977).
95. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
96. Evans was the first case subsequent to the formulation of the Milliken
standards for interdistrict relief in which the Supreme Court denied petitions for writs
of certiorari to Evans thereby refusing to review a lower court order of interdistrict
remedial scope in an urban-suburban setting. See notes 46 & 47 and accompanying
text supra.
In several recent school desegregation cases the Court has vacated and
remanded for further consideration regarding the constitutional violations found, or
their effects. See Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); School District of Omaha
v. United States, 433 U.S. 607 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406
(1977); Board of School Comm'rs. of Indianapolis v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977); and
Austin Ind. School District v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). None of these cases
involved direct review of the propriety of an interdistrict consolidation remedy based
upon adequate supporting violations, as, it is submitted, was the case in Evans. See
also note 46 and accompanying text supra.
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APPENDIX
Opinions rendered to date by the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit concerning the Wilmington desegregation problem:
1. 435 F. Supp. 832 (D. Del. 1977).
2. 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 235-36, rehearing
denied, 98 S. Ct. 442-43 (1977).
3. 424 F. Supp. 875 (D. Del. 1976).
4. 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
429 U.S. 973 (1976).
5. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975),
rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 1080 (1976).
6. 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del. 1974).
7. 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962).
8. 195 F. Supp. 321 (D. Del. 1961).
9. 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.), application for stay of execution and
enforcement of order denied, 364 U.S. 802 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933
(1961).
10. 173 F. Supp. 891 (D. Del. 1959).
11. 172 F. Supp. 508 (D. Del. 1959).
.12. 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958).
13. 152 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957).
14. 149 F. Supp. 376 (D. Del. 1957).
15. 145 F. Supp. 873 (D. Del. 1956).
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